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Possibility and permissibility

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  • Lo, Kin Chung

Abstract

We formulate the permissibility concept (Brandenburger, 1992) in terms of general preference, and prove that the solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and common "belief" of rationality and caution.

Suggested Citation

  • Lo, Kin Chung, 2011. "Possibility and permissibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 109-113, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:109-113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
    2. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    3. D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
    5. Gilboa,Itzhak, 2009. "Theory of Decision under Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521741231, November.
    6. Daniel Ellsberg, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7605, David K. Levine.
    7. Mukerji, S., 1995. "A theory of play for games in strategic form when rationality is not common knowledge," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9519, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:37:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Kin Chung Lo, 1999. "Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 621-633.
    10. Matthew J. Ryan, 2002. "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 47-65.
    11. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2014. "Admissibility in Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 7, pages 161-212 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
    13. Lo, Kin Chung, 2005. "More likely than unlikely," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 39-53, January.
    14. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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