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Possibility and permissibility

  • Lo, Kin Chung

We formulate the permissibility concept (Brandenburger, 1992) in terms of general preference, and prove that the solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and common "belief" of rationality and caution.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 62 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 109-113

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:109-113
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521741231 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
  3. Mukerji, S., 1995. "A theory of play for games in strategic form when rationality is not common knowledge," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9519, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Matthew J. Ryan, 2002. "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 47-65.
  5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  6. D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:37:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  10. Daniel Ellsberg, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7605, David K. Levine.
  11. Lo, Kin Chung, 2005. "More likely than unlikely," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 39-53, January.
  12. Machina,Mark & Schmeidler,David, 1991. "A more robust definition of subjective probability," Discussion Paper Serie A 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  13. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2008. "Admissibility in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 307-352, 03.
  14. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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