Possibility and permissibility
We generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and “common belief" of rationality and caution.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
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