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A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty

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Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (Fundação Getulio Vargas)
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Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) in its series Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) with number 376.

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Date of creation: Mar 2000
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Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:376

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  1. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty," Working Papers ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ghirardato, Paolo & Le Breton, Michel, 1997. "Choquet Rationalizability," Working Papers 1000, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. James Dow & Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, 1992. "Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 186, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
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  8. Dow, James & Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro da Costa, 1992. "Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 197-204, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1995. "NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities," Discussion Papers 95-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  13. James Dow & Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, 1992. "The Ex-Ante Non-Optimality of the Dempster-Schafer Updating Rule For Ambiguous Beliefs," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 185, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  14. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Working Papers ecpap-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Mukerji, S., 1995. "A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form when Rationality is not Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9519, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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