Ebbe Hendon (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) Hans Jorgen Jacobsen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) Birgitte Sloth (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) Torben Tranaes (Copenhagen Business School)
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A Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a common theory about the players' actions. It is required that the theory is consistent with each player choosing an optimal response to the theory. It is usually required that the theory takes the form of a combination of probability measures on players' strategies. We analyze the effects of relaxing this requirement, allowing the theory to take the form of a lower probability measure, also called a belief function. In particular this allows for a strategy that is never a best reply against probability measures on other players to be part of an equilibrium.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
95-09.
Length: 26 pages Date of creation: Jun 1995 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Theory and Decision, 1998, 44(1) pp 37-66, as: NASH Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9509
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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