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The Right to Remain Silent

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  • Joseph Greenberg

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1005205630723
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

    Volume (Year): 48 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 193-204

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:48:y:2000:i:2:p:193-204

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

    Related research

    Keywords: (Nash) equilibrium in Strategies; dynamic games; ambiguity; Knightian uncertainty;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Ebbe Groes & Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 37-66, January.
    3. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    4. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
    8. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1995. "NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities," Discussion Papers 95-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Lo, Kin Chung, 2007. "Sharing beliefs about actions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 123-133, March.
    2. Kin Chung Lo, 2007. "Correlated Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 2007_5, York University, Department of Economics.
    3. Linda Sass, 2013. "Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Working Papers 478, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    4. Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2013. "Ellsberg Games," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80012, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

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