ABC on Deals
AbstractWe develop, and experimentally test, a behavioral model of deal- making which includes binding contracts and informal agreements as distinct but related special cases. The key assumptions: people are mostly honest; they suffer costs of overcoming temptation to renege; and they tend to split gains down the middle.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 12/14.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 26 Aug 2012
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