Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
AbstractA player's strategy, for an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is subjectively rational if it is a best response to his individual beliefs regarding opponents' strategies. A vector of such strategies is a subjective equilibrium if the play induced by it is realization equivalent to the play induced by each players' beliefs. Thus, any statistical updating can only reinforce the beliefs. It is shown that under perfect monitoring, the joint behavior at a subjective equilibrium approximates a behavior of a Nash equilibrium even when perturbations are allowed. Therefore, learning processes leading to subjective equilibrium result in approximate Nash behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 981.
Date of creation: Jan 1991
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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