Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Ambiguity and Social Interaction

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Kelsey, David
  • Schipper, Burkhard C.

Abstract

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13491/1/59.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 59.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:59

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Ambiguity; Optimism; Pessimism; Strategic Games; Oligopoly; Strategic Delegation; Peace-making; Strategic Complements; Choquet Expected Utility;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cooper, Arnold C. & Woo, Carolyn Y. & Dunkelberg, William C., 1988. "Entrepreneurs' perceived chances for success," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 97-108.
  2. Kelsey, D., 1990. "Maxmin Expected Utility and Weight of Evidence," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics 216, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  3. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
  4. Grant, Simon & Chateauneuf, A. & Eichberger, J., 2002. "Choice under Uncertainty with the Best and Worst in Mind: Neo-additive Capacities," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2002-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  5. Epstein, Larry G, 1999. "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 579-608, July.
  6. Green, Jerry, 1987. ""Making Book against Oneself," the Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 785-96, November.
  7. Sarin, Rakesh K & Wakker, Peter, 1992. "A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1255-72, November.
  8. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
  9. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  10. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
  11. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
  12. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
  13. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  14. Truman F. Bewley, 1986. "Knightian Decision Theory: Part 1," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 807, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. Sarin, Rakesh & Wakker, Peter P, 1998. "Revealed Likelihood and Knightian Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 223-50, July-Aug..
  16. Dow, James & Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 1992. "Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 186, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  17. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  18. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  20. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard Schipper, 2008. "Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 333-362, March.
  21. Tversky, Amos & Wakker, Peter, 1995. "Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1255-80, November.
  22. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  23. Wakker, Peter P, 2001. "Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures through Violations of the Sure-Thing Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1039-59, July.
  24. Ghirardato, Paolo & Marinacci, Massimo, 2002. "Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-289, February.
  25. Fulvio Fontini, 2005. "Cournot Oligopoly Under Strategic Uncertainty With Optimistic And Pessimistic Firms," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 318-333, 07.
  26. Kilka, Michael & Weber, Martin, 1998. "What Determines the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function under Uncertainty?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 98-11, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  27. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1987. "Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 65-88, February.
  28. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.