Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Steffen Huck

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

  • Hans-Theo Normann

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

  • Joerg Oechssler

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

Abstract

This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behavior, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behavior.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9707/9707009.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9707/9707009.ps.gz
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9707009.

as in new window
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 18 Jul 1997
Date of revision: 22 Jul 1997
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707009

Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 38 ; figures: included
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: learning; Cournot oligopoly; experiments; imitation; best; reply process;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.