On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 85 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987.
"Renegotiation in Repeated Games,"
Economics Working Papers
8759, University of California at Berkeley.
- Chen Kong-Pin, 1995. "On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 600-610, April.
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