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Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma

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van Damme, Eric

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 206-217
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:1:p:206-217

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  1. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2003. "Prisoners' Other Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2005. "Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A Comment on Switgard Feuerstein's Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 207-215, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ben Zissimos, 2006. "The GATT and Gradualism," Working Papers 0619, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Limao, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2006. "Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3873, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1225, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Houba, H., 1992. "Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts," Serie Research Memoranda 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2000. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1999-09, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  12. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andersson , Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "Communication and Renegotiation in Two-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley, 2003. "Viable Tax Constitutions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 683, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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