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Un modelo integrado de depredación y colusión

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  • Germán Coloma

Abstract

Este trabajo presenta un modelo de depredación bajo condiciones de información completa y lo integra con un modelo de colusión. La competencia, la colusión y la depredación son estrategias alternativas de las dos empresas que se incluyen en el modelo. Las conclusiones básicas son que hay depredación cuando una empresa tiene un factor de descuento alto y la otra tiene un factor de descuento bajo, que hay competencia cuando ambas empresas tienen factores de descuento bajos, y que, cuando ambas empresas tienen factores de descuento altos, los equilibrios son múltiples y el juego puede transformarse en una guerra de desgaste. La colusión también puede sostenerse como un equilibrio de Nash en ciertos casos, pero los factores de descuento requeridos tienen un límite inferior y un límite superior.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 200.

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Date of creation: Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:200

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Related research

Keywords: Depredación; Colusión; Competencia; Guerra de desgaste; Equilibrio de Nash; Factores de descuento.;

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  1. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Predation Without Reputation," Working papers 377, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  6. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  7. Kawakami, Toshikazu & Yoshihiro, Yoshida, 1997. "Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 175-178, February.
  8. Roth, David, 1996. "Rationalizable Predatory Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 380-396, February.
  9. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion and predation under (almost) free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 381-401.
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