Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión

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Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión

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Germán Coloma

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German Coloma

Abstract

We present a two-firm model of predation under complete information, based on different discount factors, and integrate it with a model of collusion. Competition, collusion and predation are seen as alternative strategies. The basic conclusions are that there is predation when one firm has a high discount factor and the other one has a low discount factor, there is competition when both firms have low discount factors, and when both firms have high discount factors, equilibria are multiple and the game may become a war of attrition. Collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in some cases, but the required discount factors have a lower bound and an upper bound.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía.

Volume (Year): 39 (2002)
Issue (Month): 116 ()
Pages: 123-133
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Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:39:y:2002:i:116:p:123-133

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Paper
- Germán Coloma, 2001. "Un modelo integrado de depredación y colusión," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 200, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Kawakami, Toshikazu & Yoshihiro, Yoshida, 1997. "Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 175-178, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Predation Without Reputation," Working papers 377, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Roth, David, 1996. "Rationalizable Predatory Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 380-396, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion and predation under (almost) free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 381-401. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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