This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Mutually acceptable courses of action Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Joseph Greenberg ()
Sudheer Gupta ()
Xiao Luo ()
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 40 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 91-112
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:91-112Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).
Keywords: Extensive games ; Perfection ; Course of action ; Self-confirming equilibrium ; Rationalizability ; Strategic contracts ; C70 ; C72 ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994.
"Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998.
"Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
172, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
ELSE working papers
032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999.
"Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Papers
9-99, Tel Aviv.
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
ELSE working papers
040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
[Downloadable!] Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005.
"Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991.
"Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pearce, David G, 1984.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2005.
"Trees and decisions ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 763-798, 06.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Vincent P. Crawford, 2003.
"Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002.
"Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999.
"Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Working Papers
91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!] Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Greenberg, Joseph & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996.
"Multistage Situations ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1415-37, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990.
"Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .