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Mutually acceptable courses of action

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  • Joseph Greenberg

    ()

  • Sudheer Gupta

    ()

  • Xiao Luo

    ()

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Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 40 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 91-112

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:91-112

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Related research

Keywords: Extensive games; Perfection; Course of action; Self-confirming equilibrium; Rationalizability; Strategic contracts; C70; C72;

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References

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  1. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  2. Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  4. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "Trees and Decisions," Economics Series 129, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  5. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  6. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
  9. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
  12. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  13. Greenberg, Joseph & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Multistage Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1415-37, November.
  14. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  15. Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Mistaken self-perception and equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 615-641, 04.
  16. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812, October.
  17. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  18. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  19. A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky, 2010. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 369, David K. Levine.
  20. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
  21. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luo, Xiao, 2009. "The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 860-868, December.
  2. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2012. "An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 1-12, September.

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