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Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

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  • Linda Sass

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    Abstract

    Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.

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    File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/n/upload/paper/e165421110ba03099a1c0393373c5b43.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 478.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:478

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    Related research

    Keywords: Knightian Uncertainty in Games; Objective Ambiguity; Strategic Ambiguity; Extensive Form Ellsberg Games; Kuhn's Theorem; Rectangularity;

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    References

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    14. Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," Papers 1408.1022, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.

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