Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
AbstractRiedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 478.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Knightian Uncertainty in Games; Objective Ambiguity; Strategic Ambiguity; Extensive Form Ellsberg Games; Kuhn's Theorem; Rectangularity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2013-07-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-07-15 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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