Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity
AbstractIf players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 03-27.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Financial assistance from the ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, award no. H52427502595, the School of Social Science at the University of Birmingham, the Department of Economics at the University of Melbourne and The British Academy is gratefully acknowledged. For comments we would like to thank Simon Grant, Hans Haller, Youngse Kim, Bart Lipman, Frank Milne, Shasi Nandeibam, Hyun Shin, Peter Sinclair, Willy Spanjers, Martin Summer, Peter Wakker and participants in seminars at Queen
Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-68131 Mannheim
Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547
Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/
More information through EDIRC
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eichberger, Jürgen & Grant, Simon & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2008.
"Neo-additive capacities and updating,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
08-31, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Jürgen Eichberger & Simon Grant & Jean-Philippe Lefort, 2012.
"Generalized neo-additive capacities and updating,"
International Journal of Economic Theory,
The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 8(3), pages 237-257, 09.
- Eichberger, Jürgen & Grant, Simon & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Generalized neo-additive capacities and updating," Open Access publications from UniversitÃ© Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/7332, Université Paris-Dauphine.
- Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2011.
"Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?,"
Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 313-339, October.
- Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Working Papers 0469, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
- Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-08, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carsten Schmidt).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.