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Equilibrium without independence

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Author Info
Crawford, Vincent P.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 50 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 127-154
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:127-154

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. J. C. R. Alcantud & Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2002. "Choice-Nash Equilibria," Vienna Economics Papers 0209, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," KIER Working Papers 583, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Oscar Volij, 2002. "A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility," Economic theory and game theory 016, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1999-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alexander Zimper, 2007. "Strategic games with security and potential level players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 53-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty," Working Papers ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2009. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," MPRA Paper 17615, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. José Alcantud & Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2007. "Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 455-464, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. William S. Neilson, 2000. "Victory and Defeat in a Model of Behavior in Games and Toward Risk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0690, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. William S. Neilson, 1993. "An Expected Utility-User's Guide to Nonexpected Utility Experiments," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 257-274, Summer. [Downloadable!]
  12. Chaim Fershtman & Zvi Safra & Daniel Vincent, 1990. "Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility," Discussion Papers 867, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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