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Optimal auctions with ambiguity

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Author Info
Bose, Subir () (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Ozdenoren, Emre () (University of Michigan)
Pape, Andreas () (University of Michigan)

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Abstract

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989.) When the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly) increase revenue by switching to an auction providing full insurance to all types of bidders, (ii) if the seller is ambiguity neutral and any prior that is close enough to the seller's prior is included in the bidders' set of priors then the optimal auction is a full insurance auction, and (iii) in general neither the first nor the second price auction is optimal (even with suitably chosen reserve prices). When the seller is ambiguity averse and the bidders are ambiguity neutral an auction that fully insures the seller is in the set of optimal mechanisms.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 411-438
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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:203

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; mechanism design; ambiguity; uncertainty;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Antoine Billot & Alain Chateauneuf & Itzhak Gilboa & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2000. "Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 685-694, May.
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  2. Karni, E. & Safra, Z., 1988. "Rank-Dependent Probabilities," Papers 11-88, Tel Aviv.
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  3. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-99, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1994. "Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under Knightian Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 283-322, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 421-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mukerji, S., 1996. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9616, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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  8. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Eso, Peter & Futo, Gabor, 1999. "Auction design with a risk averse seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 71-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Karni, E. & Safra, Z., 1988. "Ascending Bid Auctions With Behaviorally Consistent Bidders," Papers 1-88, Tel Aviv.
  11. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Payoff Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk," Staff General Research Papers 10129, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 231-237, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret," Economics Working Papers ECO2005/10, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2009. "A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 477-489, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2009. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," MPRA Paper 17615, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.


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