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Bidders¡¯ Risk Preferences in Discriminative Auctions

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  • Yonghong Long

    (Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University
    School of Information, Renmin University of China)

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    Abstract

    We study multiple unit Discriminative auctions when the bidders share logconcave utility functions and investigate the effects of bidders risk preferences on their bid functions when all bidders share a common utility function and when the bidders exhibit different risk preferences. We extend the existing findings from single unit auctions to multiple unit Discriminative auctions, from concave utility functions to log-concave utility functions, and from identical preference to different preferences.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (May)
    Pages: 215-223

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    Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2009:v:10:i:1:p:215-223

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    Keywords: Auction; Bid function; Risk preference;

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    1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    2. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-99, November.
    3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
    4. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
    5. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June.
    6. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
    8. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1982. "Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 319-325.
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