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Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures

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Author Info
Holt, Charles A, Jr

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 88 (1980)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 433-45
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:88:y:1980:i:3:p:433-45

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  1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  2. Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2006. "Judgment aggregation on restricted domains," Research Memoranda 033, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  3. Esö, Péter & White, Lucy, 2003. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peter Eso & Lucy White, 2001. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1331, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2003. "Auctions, Information, and New Technologies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-05, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  6. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Discussion Papers 0506-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-044/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1983. "Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 254, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eric Maskin, 2004. "The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass," Economics Working Papers 0044, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2003. "A Laboratory Comparison Of Uniform And Discriminative Price Auctions Forreducing Non-Point Source Pollution," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 882, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  12. Werner Güth & Jeannette Brosig & Torsten Weiland, 2006. "Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions: An experimental investigation," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-14, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  13. Stefan Felder & Jörg Finsinger, 1987. "Auswirkungen protektionistischer und preisstützender Submissionsvorschriften auf die Baubranche," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 123(II), pages 147-173, June. [Downloadable!]
  14. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  15. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Reiss J. Philipp & Schöndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  17. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Vincent P. Crawford & Ping-Sing Kuo, 2000. "A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Kenneth French & Robert McCormick, 1982. "Sunk Costs and Competitive Bidding," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1232, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  20. Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," UCLA Economics Working Papers 359, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1981. "The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 198, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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