Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games
AbstractThere is a tension between a belief in the strategic relevance of information sets and subgames and a belief in the sufficiency of the reduced normal form. The authors identify a prope rty of extensive form information sets and subgames termed strategic independence. Strategic independence is captured by the reduced norm al form and can be used to define normal form information sets and subgames. The authors prove a close relationship between these norma l form structures and their extensive form namesakes. They then motiva te and implement solution concepts corresponding to subgame perfection, sequential equilibrium, and forward induction entirely in the reduce d normal form. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 1-90-1.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
More information through EDIRC
game theory ; information ; economic equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Mailath, G. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1991. "Extensive form reasoning in normal form games," Discussion Paper 1991-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1991. "extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Papers 9130, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1990. "Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games," Working papers 90-13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.