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Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games

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Author Info
MAILATH, G.J.
SAMUELSON, L.
SWINKELS, J.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 1-90-1.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:1-90-1

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Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Keywords: game theory ; information ; economic equilibrium;

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Cited by:
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  1. George J. Mailath, 1993. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers 1041, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B., 1997. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power," Working Papers 97-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Asheim, Geir B, 2000. "Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games," Research Papers in Economics 2000:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Brams, Steven J., 1995. "Modeling Free Choice in Games," Working Papers 95-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and common knowledge," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  10. Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 1066R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Brams, Steven J., 1992. "Cycles of Conflict," Working Papers 92-51, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2009. "Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior," MPRA Paper 15058, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter, 1992. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Working Papers 92-52, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  15. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
  16. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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