Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures
AbstractWe study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 884R.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision: Aug 1989
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1992), 4: 182-201
Note: CFP 819.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Other versions of this item:
- Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John, 1992. "Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 182-201, April.
- C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models
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- Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
- Meier, Martin, 2005. "On the nonexistence of universal information structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 132-139, May.
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- Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
- Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Enforceable Contracts under Generalized Information of the Court," Discussion Papers 1268, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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