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Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures

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Abstract

We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d08b/d0884-r.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 884R.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision: Aug 1989
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1992), 4: 182-201
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:884r

Note: CFP 819.
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Keywords: Correlated equilibria; subjective priors; bounded rationality;

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Cited by:
  1. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Enforceable Contracts under Generalized Information of the Court," Discussion Papers 1268, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
  3. Fredrik Andersson, 1999. "Uncertainty aversion in a simple insurance model," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 16-27, Spring.
  4. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Information Transmission In Elimination Contests," Working Papers 0511, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  5. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät.
  6. Gossner, Olivier & Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Testing Rationality on Primitive Knowledge," Working Papers in Economics 275, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  7. Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
  8. Jihong Lee, 2008. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, 04.
  9. Oliver Board, 2008. "Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 378, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2009.
  10. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1999. "The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 49-71, July.
  11. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society.
  12. Meier, Martin, 2005. "On the nonexistence of universal information structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 132-139, May.

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