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Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods

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Author Info

  • Harsanyi, J.C.

Abstract

People's utility levels are meant to be measures of their well-being. Early utilitarians defined them in terms of people's happiness. Modern economics defines them in terms of people's actual preferences. But in ethics they have to be defined in terms of people's informed preferences. I shall discuss the relationship between people's desires and preferences, and that between their reasoned and unreasoned preferences. I shall argue that people's basic desires are much the same, whereas their preferences are often very different. Finally, I shall argue, contrary to Scanlon's theory, that the things that are good for us are beneficial to us ultimately because they satisfy our biological and psychological needs and our personal interests.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economics Research in its series Research Paper with number 101.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:wodeec:101

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Postal: United Nations University; World Institute for Development Economics Research, Katajanokanlaituri 6B, 00160 Helsinki
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Web page: http://www.wider.unu.edu/
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Keywords: economic theory;

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Cited by:
  1. Orsolya Lelkes, 2005. "Knowing what is good for you. Empirical analysis of personal preferences and the 'objective good'," Others 0502002, EconWPA.
  2. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2006. "Mad Cows, Terrorism and Junk Food: Should Public Policy Reflect Subjective or Objective Risks?," Working Papers in Economics 194, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  3. Ricardo Arlegi, 1998. "Incomplete Preferences and The Preference for Flexibility," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 9819, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  4. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2003. "Should policy be concerned with objective or subjective risks?," Working Papers in Economics 93, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  5. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2001. "Environmental Policy when People's Preferences are Inconsistent, Non-Welfaristic, or simply Not Developed," Working Papers in Economics 34, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  6. Dolan, Paul & Metcalfe, Robert, 2012. "The relationship between innovation and subjective wellbeing," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1489-1498.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:31:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society.

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