This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space.
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Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006.
"Topologies on types,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006.
"Topologies on Type,"
Discussion Papers
1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Topologies on Types,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Mertens, J.-F., 1986.
"Repeated games,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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