Interim correlated rationalizability

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Interim correlated rationalizability

Author Info

Dekel, Eddie () (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University)
Fudenberg, Drew () (Harvard University)
Morris, Stephen () (Princeton University)

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Abstract

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 15-40
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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:140

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Paper
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov, 1998. "Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 324-341, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Forges, F., 1993. "Five Ligitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Game with Incomplete Information," Papers 9309, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," MPRA Paper 7734, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2007. "Common Belief Foundations of Global Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001638, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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