Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jonathan Weinstein
  • Muhamet Yildiz

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4122247000000000065.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000000065.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000065

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
  2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
  6. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154416, Tilburg University.
  7. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1193R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  9. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  11. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  12. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  13. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  14. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
  15. Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2003. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1394, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. Feinberg, Yossi & Skyzypacz, Andrzej, 2002. "Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1765, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  17. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  18. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  19. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  21. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  22. Nyarko, Yaw, 1997. "Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 266-296, June.
  23. Yossi Feinberg & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 69-91, 01.
  24. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-88, August.
  25. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
  2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on Types," Scholarly Articles 3160489, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp350, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Jean-Marc Tallon, 2006. "Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre : deux applications," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177058, HAL.
  5. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
  6. Bhatt, Meghana & Camerer, Colin F., 2005. "Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 424-459, August.
  7. Lipman, Barton L., 2010. "Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 56-70, January.
  8. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2011. "Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 288-300, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.