Finite Order Implications of Common Priors in Infinite Models
AbstractLipman  shows that in a finite model, the common prior assumption has weak implications for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs. In particular, the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. To explore the role of the finite model assumption in generating this conclusion, this paper considers the finite order implications of common priors in a countable model. I show that in countable models, the common prior assumption also implies a tail consistency condition regarding beliefs. More specifically, I show that in a countable model, the finite order implications of the common prior assumption are the same as those stemming from the assumption that priors have a common support and have tail probabilities converging to zero at the same rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2005-009.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Lipman, Barton L., 2010. "Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 56-70, January.
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-18 (All new papers)
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