Klaus Nehring () (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)
Abstract
Two agents are like-minded when their beliefs are equal once conditioned on knowledge of both of their types. Assuming the existence of an outside observer that is commonly known to be likeminded and uninformative about the insiders, we derive the existence of a common prior among the insiders, with the outsiders beliefs (appropriately conditioned) serving as the common prior. A key advantage of like-mindedness is its fully local definition, which allows to distinction between consistency of agent’s actual beliefs and of beliefs they merely view as possible. By later including agents’ “epistemic attitudes” among the primitives, we derive like-mindedness from reasonableness judgments about each others attitudes. In this richer framework, one can model alternative conceptions of intersubjective rationality as constraints on such reasonableness judgements.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number
0035.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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