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Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents

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Author Info
Klaus Nehring () (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)
Abstract

Two agents are like-minded when their beliefs are equal once conditioned on knowledge of both of their types. Assuming the existence of an outside observer that is commonly known to be likeminded and uninformative about the insiders, we derive the existence of a common prior among the insiders, with the outsiders beliefs (appropriately conditioned) serving as the common prior. A key advantage of like-mindedness is its fully local definition, which allows to distinction between consistency of agent’s actual beliefs and of beliefs they merely view as possible. By later including agents’ “epistemic attitudes” among the primitives, we derive like-mindedness from reasonableness judgments about each others attitudes. In this richer framework, one can model alternative conceptions of intersubjective rationality as constraints on such reasonableness judgements.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0035.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0035

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Related research
Keywords: Common Prior Assumption; Like-Mindedness; Incomplete Information; Intersubjective Rationality; Pluralism; Relativism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 172-174, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  7. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-47, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2002. "Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 316-355, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Robert J. Aumann, 1998. "Common Priors: A Reply to Gul," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 929-938, July.
  11. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1999. "How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 409-434. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Department of Economics 97-03, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dov Samet, 2006. "Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000536, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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