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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 91 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 127-179
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:91:y:2000:i:2:p:127-179

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