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Common Knowledge

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Author Info
John Geanakoplos () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Abstract

This paper surveys the implications of "common knowledge" in interactive epistemology and game theory, with special emphasis on speculation, betting, agreeing to disagree, and coordination. The implications of approximate common knowledge are also analyzed. Approximate common knowledge is defined three ways: as knowledge of knowledge ... of knowledge, iterated N times; as p-common knowledge; and as weak p-common knowledge. Finally the implications of common knowledge are examined when agents are boundedly rational.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p08a/p0828.pdf
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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d10b/d1062.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1062.

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Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: Aug 1993
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Perspectives (Fall 1992), 6(4): 53-82
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1062

Note: CFP 828.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Knowledge; partition; common knowledge; speculation; betting; agreement; coordination; Bayesian; Nash;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003. "Reasoning About Knowledge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006, December.
  6. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  13. McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1986. "Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 109-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Milgrom, Paul, 1981. "An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 219-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eduardo Zambrano, 2004. "Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Felipe Zurita, 2004. "Essays on Speculation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000849, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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