The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation
AbstractLet S be a set of logically related propositions, and suppose a jury must decide the truth/falsehood of each member of S. A `judgement aggregation rule' (JAR) is a rule for combining the truth valuations on S from each juror into a collective truth valuation on S. Recent work has shown that there is no reasonable JAR which always yields a logically consistent collective truth valuation; this is referred to as the `Doctrinal Paradox' or the `Discursive Dilemma'. In this paper we will consider JARs which aggregate the subjective probability estimates of the jurors (rather than Boolean truth valuations) to produce a collective probability estimate for each proposition in S. We find that to properly aggregate these probability estimates, the JAR must also utilize information about the private information from which each juror generates her own probability estimate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8412.
Date of creation: 23 Apr 2008
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discursive dilemma; doctrinal paradox; judgement aggregation; statistical opinion pool; interactive epistemology; common knowledge; epistemic democracy; deliberative democracy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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