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The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation

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  • Pivato, Marcus

Abstract

Let S be a set of logically related propositions, and suppose a jury must decide the truth/falsehood of each member of S. A `judgement aggregation rule' (JAR) is a rule for combining the truth valuations on S from each juror into a collective truth valuation on S. Recent work has shown that there is no reasonable JAR which always yields a logically consistent collective truth valuation; this is referred to as the `Doctrinal Paradox' or the `Discursive Dilemma'. In this paper we will consider JARs which aggregate the subjective probability estimates of the jurors (rather than Boolean truth valuations) to produce a collective probability estimate for each proposition in S. We find that to properly aggregate these probability estimates, the JAR must also utilize information about the private information from which each juror generates her own probability estimate.

Suggested Citation

  • Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation," MPRA Paper 8412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Franz Dietrich, 2010. "Bayesian group belief," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(4), pages 595-626, October.
    2. List, Christian, 2010. "The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27596, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discursive dilemma; doctrinal paradox; judgement aggregation; statistical opinion pool; interactive epistemology; common knowledge; epistemic democracy; deliberative democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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