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On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol

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  • Tsakas Elias
  • Voorneveld Mark

    (METEOR)

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    Abstract

    The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among Bayesianagents to cases where the structure of the communication protocol is not commonly known.We show that, even under strict conditions on the structure of the protocols and the nature of the transmitted signals, a consensus may never be reached if very little asymmetric information about the protocol is introduced.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 016.

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    Date of creation: 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010016

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    Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
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    Keywords: Economics (Jel: A);

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    1. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
    2. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
    4. Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
    5. Koessler, Frederic, 2001. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 139-159, September.
    6. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
    7. Heifetz, Aviad, 1996. "Comment on Consensus without Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 273-277, July.
    8. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp393, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979. "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
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