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Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information

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  • McKelvey, Richard D
  • Page, Talbot
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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 54 (1986)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 109-27

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:1:p:109-27

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    Cited by:
    1. Hanson, Robin, 2002. "Disagreement is unpredictable," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 365-369, November.
    2. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W., 2009. "On eliciting beliefs in strategic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 98-109, August.
    3. James Bergin, 1986. "We Eventually Agree," Discussion Papers 710, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Trautmann, S.T. & Kuilen, G. van de, 2011. "Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums," Discussion Paper 2011-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Adam Brandenburger & John Geanakoplos, 1988. "Common Knowledge of Summary Statistics," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 864, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    7. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Coval, Joshua D. & Thakor, Anjan V., 2005. "Financial intermediation as a beliefs-bridge between optimists and pessimists," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 535-569, March.
    9. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-30, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Yiling Chen & Mike Ruberry & Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, 2012. "Designing Informative Securities," Papers 1210.4837, arXiv.org.
    11. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2012. "Informational Benefits of International Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 185-202, October.
    12. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2005. "Strategy-proof risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-254, February.
    13. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1996. "Common knowledge: The case of linear regression," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 285-304.
    14. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200305, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2003.
    15. Vives, Xavier, 1997. "Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 177-200, August.
    16. Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
    17. Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet," Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    18. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001309, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Robin Hanson, 1998. "Consensus By Identifying Extremists," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 293-301, June.
    20. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 464-489, May.

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