Tsakas, Elias () (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) Voorneveld, Mark () (Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, The Netherlands)
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We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, in contrast with claims to the contrary in the existing literature, communication under a fair protocol may not lead to common knowledge of signals. We prove that commonly known signals are achieved if the individuals convey, in addition to their own message, the information about every individual’s most recent signal they are aware of. If the signal is a posterior probability about some event, common knowledge implies consensus.
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Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
255.
Length: 15 pages Date of creation: 18 Jun 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0255
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden Phone: 031-773 10 00 Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
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