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Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs

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  • Tomasz Strzalecki

Abstract

As demonstrated by the email game of Rubinstein (1989), the predictions of the standard equilibrium models of game theory are sensitive to assumptions about the fine details of the higher order beliefs. This paper shows that models of bounded depth of reasoning based on level-k thinking or cognitive hierarchy make predictions that are independent of the tail assumptions on the higher order beliefs. In addition to this finding, the tools developed in this paper o er a new direction for the analysis of models of bounded depth of reasoning and their applications to various economic settings. (JEL C72, D03)

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File URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/tomasz/node/8334
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University OpenScholar in its series Working Paper with number 8334.

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Date of creation: Dec 1969
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Handle: RePEc:qsh:wpaper:8334

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Cited by:
  1. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2012. "All Types Naive and Canny," Discussion Papers 1550, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Larbi Alaoui & Antonio Penta, 2012. "Endogenous depth of reasoning," Economics Working Papers 1332, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2014.
  3. Marina Agranov & Elizabeth Potamites & rew Schotter & Chloe Tergiman, 2012. "Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 7497, Mathematica Policy Research.
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  5. Willemien Kets, 2012. "Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 1547, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
  7. Davide Cianciaruso & Fabrizio Germano, 2011. "Quotient Spaces of Boundedly Rational Types," Working Papers 582, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2013. "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté," Discussion Papers 1573, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Willemien Kets, 2013. "Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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