1. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 1193R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
4. Feinberg, Yossi & Skyzypacz, Andrzej, 2002. "Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," Research Papers 1765, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
5. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
   Other versions:
   • Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   • Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
   Other versions:
   • Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
8. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December. [Downloadable!]
11. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Yossi Feinberg & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 69-91, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000109, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)