Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices
AbstractIn this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (1988) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (1993) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number peters-95-02.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 1995
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Other versions of this item:
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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