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Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices

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  • Michael Peters
  • Sergei Severinov

Abstract

In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (1988) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (1993) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number peters-95-02.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-95-02

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  1. Raymond Deneckere & James Peck, 1995. "Competition Over Price and Service Rate When Demand is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 148-162, Spring.
  2. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  5. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
  6. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
  8. James Peck, 1995. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Working Papers, Ohio State University, Department of Economics 022, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September.
  10. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
  11. Peters Michael, 1994. "Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 390-423, December.
  12. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
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