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Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market

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  • Peters Michael

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 64 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 390-423

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:2:p:390-423

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. Hammond, Robert G., 2013. "A structural model of competing sellers: Auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 52-68.
  2. Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, 1999. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 719-749.
  3. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  4. Germano, Fabrizio, 2003. "Bertrand-edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 677-692, July.
  5. Damian Damianov, 2012. "Seller competition by mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 105-137, September.
  6. Anindya Ghose, 2005. "Used Good Trade Patterns: A Cross-Country Comparison of Electronic Secondary Markets," Working Papers, NET Institute 05-19, NET Institute, revised Oct 2005.
  7. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2004. "Equilibrium Selling Mechanisms," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 335-355, November.
  8. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  9. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2006. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 660.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 19 Apr 2006.
  10. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
  11. Kugler, Tamar & Neeman, Zvika & Vulkan, Nir, 2006. "Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 121-134, July.

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