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Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices

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Author Info
Peters, Michael
Severinov, Sergei

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 75 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 141-179
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:1:p:141-179

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Peters Michael, 1994. "Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 390-423, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. James Peck, 1995. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Working Papers 022, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005. "Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay," Microeconomics 0505001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a Coordination Device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  7. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2003. "An Ascending Double Auction," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-03-12-16-01-57-39, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 26 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Sergei Severinov & Michael Peters, 2004. "Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 551, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Matthew Doyle & Jacob Wong, 2008. "Wage Posting Without Full Commitment," Working Papers 08004, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Marta Stryszowska, 2004. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price," Working Papers 2004.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alain Delacroix & Shouyong Shi, 2007. "Pricing and Signaling with Frictions," Working Papers tecipa-298, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Damianov, Damian, 2008. "Seller Competition by Mechanism Design," MPRA Paper 9348, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Sarah Parlane, 2005. "Auctioning Horizontally Differentiated Items," Working Papers 200525, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. repec:att:wimass:1920111 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, . "Efficient Job Allocation," Penn CARESS Working Papers f254df043aa954b9f2d76c248, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  19. Stryszowska, M., 2004. "Late and multiple bidding in competing second price internet auctions," Discussion Paper 43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  20. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius, 2003. "Competing Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000092, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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