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Bidding for Labour

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Author Info

  • Julien, B.
  • Kennes, J.
  • King, I.

Abstract

We present a competing-auction theory of the labour market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction process also generates an equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers. We characterize thge expected rate of pure "coordination unemployment": unemployment that exists purely for coordination reasons.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number dp98-03.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp98-03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Phone: (778)782-3508
Fax: (778)782-5944
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
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Order Information:
Postal: Working Paper Coordinator, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Email:
Web: http://www.sfu.ca/economics/research/publications.html

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Keywords: LABOUR MARKET ; AUCTIONS;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 217-27, April.
  2. King, Ian & Welling, Linda & Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Investment decisions under first and second price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 289-293, July.
  3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
  4. Dale T. Mortensen, 1979. "The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game," Discussion Papers 384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
  6. Richard Rogerson, 1997. "Theory Ahead of Language in the Economics of Unemployment," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 73-92, Winter.
  7. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
  8. Dan Bernhardt & David Scoones, 1991. "Promotion: Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers," Working Papers 817, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  9. Pissarides, C A, 1979. "Job Matchings with State Employment Agencies and Random Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(356), pages 818-33, December.
  10. Shouyong Shi, 1998. "Frictional Assignment," Working Papers 988, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
  12. King, Ian & Welling, Linda, 1995. "Search, unemployment, and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 499-507, June.
  13. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
  14. Kultti, K.K., 1997. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper 1997-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Kennes, John, 1997. "Efficient search and recruiting: Choosing sides in matching games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 59-63, January.
  16. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
  17. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  18. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 1998. "Pricing with frictions," Working Papers 98-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  19. Arthur Sweetman & Peter Kuhn, 1998. "Unemployment Insurance and Quits in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 549-572, August.
  20. Ian King & R. Preston McAfee & Linda Welling, 1993. "Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic Tax Competition and Public Investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 590-608, August.
  21. Peters Michael, 1994. "Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 390-423, December.
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