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Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers

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Author Info
Bernhardt, Dan
Scoones, David

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Abstract

This paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when employees may be more valuable to competing firms. Competing employers must incur a cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager. Promotion signals that workers are potentially valuable managers in other firms and so can lead to turnover. To preempt competition for a manager, an employer may offer a wage high enough to discourage competitors from acquiring information and bidding up the wage further or hiring the worker away. This transfers wages from good workers to bad. More costly information acquisition yields greater expected lifetime wages. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 83 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 771-91
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:4:p:771-91

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  1. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Pablo Acosta, 2004. "Promotions, State Dependence and Intrafirm Job Mobility: Evidence From Personnel Records," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 585, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carolyn Pitchik & Aloysius Siow, 1997. "Self-Promoting Investments," Working Papers pitchik-97-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," NBER Working Papers 13268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Beker, Pablo F, 2007. "Retained Earnings Dynamic, Internal Promotions and Walrasian Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 813, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. repec:ese:iserwp: is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants," Working Papers 200303, Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lima, Francisco & Pereira, Pedro Telhado, 2001. "Careers and Wage Growth within Large Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 336, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  12. repec:bep:thetop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1297-1297 is not listed on IDEAS
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