This paper examines efficient and equilibrium allocations in an economy where agents with diverse characteristics are matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. This is cast in a labour market where workers of different skills match with machines of different qualities. The efficient assignment is not always positively assortative and can be decentralized by a competitive mechanism where firms compete by posting wages and committing to the skill that their chosen machines are intended for. Implications on wage inequality are examined.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
988.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000.
"Bidding for Labor,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998.
"Bidding for Labour,"
Discussion Papers
dp98-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999.
"Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-49, November.
Other versions:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000.
"Bidding for Labor,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998.
"Bidding for Labour,"
Discussion Papers
dp98-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.