Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment
AbstractWe study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non-cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite-sized markets where the equilibrium-matching process has decreasing returns to scale - where the `Hosios rule' does not apply - both with and without heterogeneity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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