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Abstract

We examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market, and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with Nash bargaining. Both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered, and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed. As with the random matching model, job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model. Both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 956-983

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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:42:y:2009:i:3:p:956-983

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

References

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1. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Taxes, Subsidies, and Equilibrium Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 121-33, January.
2. Benoît Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2005. "Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 174-193, February.
3. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
4. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
5. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
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7. Etienne LEHMANN & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2002. "On the optimality of search matching equilibrium when workers are risk averse," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
   
   • Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.
   • Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2004. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," IZA Discussion Papers 1172, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
   • Lehmann E. & Van Der Linden B., 2004. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when workers are risk adverse," Working Papers ERMES 0406, ERMES, University Paris 2.
8. Mathias Hungerb�hler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2006. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 743-767.
   
   • Hungerbühler, Mathias & Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2005. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," IZA Discussion Papers 1460, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
9. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2006. "Residual Wage Disparity And Coordination Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 961-989, 08.
   
   • Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2001. "Residual Wage Disparity and Coordination Unemployment," CAM Working Papers 2004-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, revised Nov 2004.
10. Ian King, 2003. "A directed tour of search-theoretic explanations for unemployment," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 245-267.
11. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2002. "Optimal labour taxation and search," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 53-97, July.
    
    • Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2001. "Optimal Labour Taxation and Search," CEPR Discussion Papers 3002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Boone, J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 2000. "Optimal Labour Taxation and Search," Discussion Paper 2000-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
12. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
13. Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2006. "The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 149-155, February.
    
    • John Kennes & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2002. "The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment," Macroeconomics 0206001, EconWPA.
14. repec:aea:jeclit:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:959-988 is not listed on IDEAS
15. Hungerbuhler, M, 2006. "Optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model. Rev. Econ. Stud," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/38888, Université catholique de Louvain.
16. repec:bla:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:743-767 is not listed on IDEAS
17. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
18. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
    
    • Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998. "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers dp98-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

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