Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model
Abstract
the firms' market power.Download Info
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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 519.Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:519
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher & Gábor Virág, 2011. "Market Power And Efficiency In A Search Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 85-103, 02.
- Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model," MPRA Paper 17093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp & Virag, Gabor, 2011. "Market power and efficiency in a search model," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012.
"Competing Through Information Provision,"
Working Papers
1201, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
- Jean Guillaume Forand, 2007. "Competing Through Information Provision," 2007 Meeting Papers 661, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2011. "It's About Time: Implications of the Period Length in an Equilibrium Job Search Model," IZA Discussion Papers 6002, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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