Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3434.
Length: 2008 pages Date of creation: Apr 2008 Date of revision: Publication status: forthcoming in: Economic Theory, 2008 Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3434
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