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Sorting and decentralized price competition

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  • Jan Eeckhout
  • Philipp Kircher

Abstract

Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29705/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 29705.

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Date of creation: 08 Apr 2010
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Publication status: Published in Econometrica, 8, April, 2010, 78(2), pp. 539-574. ISSN: 0012-9682
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:29705

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Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
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Related research

Keywords: Competitive search equilibrium; directed search; two-sided matching; decentralized price competition; complementarity; root-supermodularity; sorting;

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References

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  1. Alain Delacroix & Shouyong Shi, 2006. "Directed Search On The Job And The Wage Ladder," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 651-699, 05.
  2. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
  3. Michael Peters, 1995. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Working Papers peters-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  4. Shi, Shouyong, 2002. "A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill-Based Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 467-91, April.
  5. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-49, November.
  6. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July.
  7. Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  8. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
  9. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Pricing in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000011, David K. Levine.
  10. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
  11. Robert Shimer, 2001. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs In an Economy with Coordination Frictions," NBER Working Papers 8501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," GE, Growth, Math methods, EconWPA 9507001, EconWPA.
  13. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2004. "Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium," Working Paper 0405, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  14. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
  15. Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
  16. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2009. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 253-281.
  17. Butters, Gerard R, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 465-91, October.
  18. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October.
  19. Shouyong Shi, 1998. "Frictional Assignment," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal 74, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  20. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2005. "Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  21. Guido Menzio, 2007. "A Theory of Partially Directed Search," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  22. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September.
  23. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  24. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
  25. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
  26. Lauermann, Stephan, 2011. "Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach," MPRA Paper 31717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  28. Philipp Kircher & Jan Eeckhout, 2008. "Prices as Optimal Competitive Sales Mechanisms," 2008 Meeting Papers 504, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  29. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb..
  30. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  31. Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
  32. Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  33. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
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