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The Marriage Model with Search Frictions

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Author Info
Lones Smith

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Abstract

Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative—higher types match with higher sets of types—when the proportionate gains from having better partners rise in one's type. With multiplicatively separable payoffs, these proportionate gains are constant in one's type, and "block segregation" arises, a common finding of the literature.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 114 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1124-1146
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:114:y:2006:i:6:p:1124-1146

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  1. Wong, Linda, 2001. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," 10th International Conference on Panel Data, Berlin, July 5-6, 2002 A1-1, International Conferences on Panel Data. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2003. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Economics Working Papers 0030, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, . "Income Taxation and Marital Decisions," Working Papers 2133479, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Belot, Michèle & Francesconi, Marco, 2006. "Can Anyone be 'The One'? Evidence on Mate Selection from Speed Dating," CEPR Discussion Papers 5926, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. repec:ese:iserwp: is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coenraad N. Teulings, 2005. "Marriage and the City," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2000. "Competing Pre-marital Investments," Working Papers peters-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Giolito, Eugenio P., 2004. "A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity," IZA Discussion Papers 1082, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Frederick Chen, 2003. "Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(17), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lones Smith & Axel Anderson, 2002. "Assortative Matching, Reputation, and the Beatles Break-Up," Game Theory and Information 0201002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Melvyn G. Coles & Marco Francesconi, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  14. Eugenio Giolito, 2004. "A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity," Labor and Demography 0402007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, . "Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis," Working Papers 2132862, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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