Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search
AbstractThe paper contrasts the exact equilibria of games where sellers compete in price with the rational expectations equilibria of these games. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers in both the exact and rational expectations equilibrium converge weakly to the same limit as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. Furthermore, the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 95 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Peters, 1995.
"On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts,"
GE, Growth, Math methods
- Peters, Michael, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 241-64, April.
- Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Gould, John P, 1978. "Inventories and Stochastic Demand: Equilibrium Models of the Firm and Industry," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, January.
- Moen, E.R., 1995.
"Competitive Search Equilibrium,"
37/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
- Peters, Michael, 1997.
"A Competitive Distribution of Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January.
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995.
"Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices,"
peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
- Carlton, Dennis W, 1978.
"Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 571-87, September.
- D. W. Carlton, 1976. "Market Behavior With Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility," Working papers 179, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Douglas Gale, 1994.
"Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection,"
0046, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Gale, Douglas, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 207-35, February.
- Douglas Gale, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 207-235.
- Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R., 1997.
"Efficient Unemployment Insurance,"
97-9, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan, 1992.
"Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 543-562.
- James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 1989. "Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty," Working Papers 760, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991.
"Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games,"
981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- Gale, Douglas, 1992. "A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 229-55, April.
- Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 1998. "Pricing with frictions," Working Papers 98-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Peters, Michael, 1984. "Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1117-27, September.
- McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.