Identifying Sorting - In Theory
Abstract
We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching between worker and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive matching models the wages are determined by the marginal contribution of a worker, and the marginal contribution might be higher or lower for low productivity firms depending on the production function. For every production function that induces positive sorting we can find a production function that induces negative sorting but generates identical wages. This arises even when we allow for non-competitive mismatch, for example due to search frictions. Even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength, i.e., the magnitude of the cross-partial, and the associated welfare loss. While we show analytically that standard fixed effects regressions are not suitable to recover the strength of sorting, we propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions independent of the sign of the sorting.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 09-007.Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 02 Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:09-007
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Email:
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: sorting; assortative matching; identification; linked employer-employee data; interpretation of fixed-effects;Other versions of this item:
- Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2011. "Identifying Sorting--In Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 872-906.
- Philipp Kircher & Jan Eeckhout, 2009. "Identifying Sorting, In Theory," 2009 Meeting Papers 581, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2011. "Identifying sorting: in theory," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Identifying Sorting: In Theory," IZA Discussion Papers 4004, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-02-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-02-14 (Labour Economics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gautier, Pieter A & Teulings, Coen N, 2005.
"How Large are Search Frictions?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pieter A. Gautier & Coen N. Teulings, 2006. "How Large are Search Frictions?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1193-1225, December.
- Gautier, Pieter A & Teulings, Coen N, 2003. "How Large are Search Frictions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pieter Gautier & Coen Teulings, 2005. "How Large are Search Frictions," 2005 Meeting Papers 175, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Rute Mendes & Gerard J. van den Berg & Maarten Lindeboom, 2007.
"An Empirical Assessment of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market,"
Carlo Alberto Notebooks
62, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Mendes, Rute & van den Berg, Gerard J. & Lindeboom, Maarten, 2010. "An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 919-929, December.
- Mendes, Rute & van den Berg, Gerard J. & Lindeboom, Maarten, 2007. "An Empirical Assessment of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 3053, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Mendes, Rute & van den Berg, Gerard J & Lindeboom, Maarten, 2007. "An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market," Working Paper Series 2007:30, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2008.
"Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 539-574, 03.
- Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2010. "Sorting and decentralized price competition," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Alp E. Atakan, 2006.
"Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, 05.
- Alp Atakan, 2005. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," 2005 Meeting Papers 218, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Sattinger, Michael, 1975. "Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 455-68, May.
- Jean-Marc Robin & Costas Meghir & Jeremy Lise, 2008.
"Matching, Sorting and Wages,"
2008 Meeting Papers
273, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jean-Marc Robin & Costas Meghir & Jeremy Lise, 2009. "Matching, Sorting and Wages," 2009 Meeting Papers 180, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:09-007For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

