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High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms

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Author Info
John M. Abowd
Francis Kramarz
David N. Margolis

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Abstract

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers and over 500,000 employing firms. Real total annual compensation per worker is decomposed into components related to observable characteristics, worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person-effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm-effects, while important, are not as important as person-effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person-effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We also find that person-effects explain 97% of inter-industry wage differentials.

Nous étudions un échantillon de données longitudinales sur plus de un million de travailleurs français à l'emploi de plus de 500 000 entreprises. La rémunération annuelle totale par travailleur, en chiffres réels, est divisée en composantes reliées aux caractéristiques observables, à l'hétérogénéité des travailleurs, à l'hétérogénéité des entreprises et à la variation résiduelle. ¸ l'exception du résidu, toutes les composantes peuvent être corrélées de façon arbitraire. Sur le plan des travailleurs, nous trouvons que les effets individuels, notamment les effets reliés à des caractéristiques observables comme le niveau d'études, sont une source très importante de dispersion des salaires en France. Les effets propres à l'entreprise, même s'ils sont importants, ne sont pas aussi importants que les effets individuels. Sur le plan des entreprises, nous trouvons que les entreprises qui embauchent des travailleurs à salaire élevé sont plus productives0501s non plus rentables. Elles se caractérisent également comme des entreprises à forte intensité de capital et en travailleurs hautement qualifiés. Les entreprises qui paient des salaires plus élevés, compte tenu des effets individuels, sont plus productives et plus rentables. Elles ont aussi une plus forte intensité en capital,0501s n'utilisent pas proportionnellement plus de travailleurs hautement qualifiés. Nous trouvons enfin que les effets individuels expliquent 97 pour cent des différences de salaires entre industries.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 94s-23.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:94s-23

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Related research
Keywords: Compensation Wage variation Productivity Rémunération Dispersion des salaires Productivité

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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References listed on IDEAS
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  17. Abowd, John M & Lemieux, Thomas, 1993. "The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 983-1014, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Jonathan S. Leonard, 1990. "Executive pay and firm performance," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 13-29, February.
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